In 1962, delivering a speech to the US Military Academy at West Point, former secretary of state Dean Acheson argued that “Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role.”
This was a simplification on Acheson’s part. Britain, in fact, had found a postwar role: we were to be America’s closest adjunct, an indispensable counsellor and a force multiplier through diplomacy, intelligence and counter-insurgency.
Yet in 2026, Keir Starmer’s cautious balancing act during the Iran war – allowing the US limited use of British bases while refusing to join military action – prompted a backlash from our closest ally.
A leaked Pentagon email floated reviewing US diplomatic support for the UK over the Falklands as punishment; Donald Trump has called for a united Ireland and told Britain to “get your own oil!” after the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
In October, the distance between British and American sanctions regimes on Russia widened into a yawning gap. Within a month of signing the Graham Act – a law mandating sanctions on Russian energy and penalties on countries that continue buying from Moscow – the White House waived most of its sanctions.
Should Ukraine reach a peace conference, there will be a radical divergence between the UK and the US over what an acceptable deal for Kyiv entails. Even under a future Democratic president, there is a strong chance that the US will be too distracted by China and the Middle East to offer Britain or Ukraine more than diplomatic support. After the recent midterms there is now an even greater chance that a future Democratic administration will be pulled towards restraint, influenced by the fallout from the Iran war and the party’s democratic socialist wing. Where should an increasingly exposed UK turn?